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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
MIRANDA V. STATE OF ARIZONA-THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT ENTERS THE POLICE STATION
The Supreme Court of the United States, in rendering its monumental
right to counsel decision in the case of Escobedo v. State of Illinois,'
prompted a deluge of scholarly articles, some decrying the ruling, some
praising it, but all attempting to interpret it.2 Equal confusion is to be
noted in the court decisions seeking to unravel its precise holding.3 In an
attempt to clarify its ruling in Escobedo, and to give the states and federal
government precise guidelines, the Supreme Court took up for considera-
tion four cases dealing with station-house confessions. 4
On June 13, 1966, in the case of Miranda v. State of Arizona,5 the Su-
preme Court rendered, perhaps, its most controversial decision to date. In
brief, the Court ruled that prior to any interrogation of an accused, he
must be warned of his right to remain silent and his right to have counsel
present during any questioning. It will be the purpose of this comment to
analyze this decision in depth and to suggest a possible alternative to the
states in their attempt to effectuate it.
In the series of confession and right to counsel cases beginning in the
federal courts with Johnson v. ZerbstO and culminating with Mallory v.
1378 U.S. 478 (1963). In that case, the police did not effectively advise the accused
of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. The Court ruled
as follows: "We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,
the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of inter-
rogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested
and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not
effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused
has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment . . .
and that no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used
against him at a criminal trial."
2 See, e.g. Enker and Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States, and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 47 (1964); Hermann, The Supreme Court and
Restrictions on Police interrogation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449 (1964); Kamisar, Equal Jus-
tice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in Criminal
Justice in Our Time (1965); Dowling, Escobedo and Beyond: The Need for a Four-
teenth Amendment Code of Criminal Procedure, 56 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 143, 156
(1965).
8 For a concise summary, in digest form, of the cases attempting to interpret Escobedo,
see DEFENDER NEWSLETrER, Vol. II, No. 2, NATIONAL LFGAL AID AND DEFENDER Asso-
CIATION (March 1, 1965).
4 Miranda v. State of Arizona, Vignera v. State of New York, Westover v. United
States, and State of California v. Stewart. All are cited as 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In each
of the four cases, the defendant was interrogated by police officials while in custody,
and was not effectively warned of his right to counsel or silence.
5 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 6 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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United States7 and the Public Defender Act of 1964,8 and from Powell v.
Alabama9 to Escobedo, on the state level, the Supreme Court has expressed
a growing concern over the protection of the ignorant and indigent in our
system of criminal justice. These decisions, especially Escobedo, have
moved closer and closer to the realization that the protections of our
federal constitution go into effect as soon as society moves against an indi-
vidual. This was clearly evidenced in Escobedo, where for the first time
the court expressly stated the need for effectuation of basic constitutional
rights at the police-station level.10
Aside from its ruling as to counsel, the court in Escobedo also empha-
sized the failure of the police to inform the accused of his right to remain
silent." It is this factor which is the main concern of the Court in its deci-
sion in the Miranda case:
That case [Escobedo] was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined
in our [c]onstitution-that 'No person .. .shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself' and that 'the accused shall .. .have the
Assistance of Counsel'-rights which were put in jeopardy in that case through
official overbearing. 12
CASE ANALYSIS
Prior to any extended analysis of the principles and practical considera-
tions involved in the Miranda decision, it is necessary to examine rather
closely just what it requires as prerequisites to the admissibility of an
accused's statements given at the in-custody level. The Court states that
the prosecution may not use in evidence statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, elicited during in-custody interrogation of an accused, un-
less it first demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards to protect the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.' 3 Custodial interrogation
is defined as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty of
action in any significant way.'
14
Initially, if an accused is to be interrogated by the police he must be
told in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.
This warning must be accompanied by an explanation that anything said
can be used against the accused in court.' 5 As a necessary protective device
to assure that the accused's fifth amendment right remains unfettered
7 354 U.S. 449 (1957). 9 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
8 18 U.S.C. S 3006A (1964). 1oSupra note 1, at 488.
11 Ibid. ". . . Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of
the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-
incrimination."
12 Supra note 5, at 442. 14 Ibid.
13Id. at 444. 15 Ibid.
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throughout the entire interrogation process, the accused must also be told
of his right to have counsel present during any questioning, and that if he
is indigent, counsel will be provided for him. The Court emphasizes that
the giving of these warnings are "absolute prerequisites to any interroga-
tion of the accused.'
'16
Once the warnings have been administered, if the accused indicates in
any manner, or at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes
to remain silent or have counsel present, the interrogation must cease. If
questioning continues without the presence of counsel and a statement is
given by the accused, a heavy burden rests on the government to establish
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. If the
prosecution fails to demonstrate the giving of the warnings to the accused
and his waiver, 17 any statements made by the accused are inadmissible in
evidence.
RATIONALE OF THE DECISION
Given the basic requirements set out by the Court in Miranda as to the
admissibility of station-house confessions, it is necessary to analyze the
reasoning behind the Court's ruling. The Court stressed the belief that
present day police interrogation methods are in conflict with the cherished
principle that an individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself.' 8
The principles inherent in the privilege against self-incrimination have
had a steady development from their inception in the early common law,'9
to its utilization in documentary form in the United States.20 At the time
of the Miranda decision the constitutions of forty-eight of the fifty states
contained a provision guaranteeing the privilege. 21 The Court points out
that the underlying premise beneath the growth and development of the
privilege is the proper balance between the rights of society and the indi-
vidual:
16 "We will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware
of his rights without a warning being given." Supra note 5, at 468.
17 ,,... a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused
after the warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact
eventually obtained." Id. at 475.
18 "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
19 See, The Trial of John Lilburn and John Wharton, 3 How. ST. TR. 1315 (1637-
1645), discussed in Miranda, supra note 5, at 1459.
20 Provisions as to the privilege against self-incrimination were incorporated into the
Federal Bill of Rights as well as in the first bills of rights in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. See PouN, T-E DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 86 (1957).
21 See, 8 WGMoRE, EVIDENCE, 5 2252, n. 3 (3d ed. 1940). New Jersey and Iowa
achieved the same result through other legal procedures.
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[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a gov-
ernment-state or federal-must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizen.
... Our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government
seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own
independent labors rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it
from his own mouth.22
The Court cites its decision of nearly seventy years ago in the case of
Bram v. United States,23 as recognizing that principle in confession cases
in federal courts. However, the court notes that due to the adoption by
Congress of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,2 4 and
the Court's effectuation of that rule in McNabb v. United States25 and
Mallory v. United States, 26 they have had little occasion to delve into the
constitutional issues in federal confession and interrogation cases. Never-
theless, the principles expostulated in those two cases were based on the
same considerations as to the fifth and sixth amendment rights as are in-
volved in the Miranda decision.27 Due to the Court's ruling in Malloy v.
Hogan,28 which held the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, as well as all substantive standards underlying it, squarely applica-
ble to the states, 29 a brief examination of the principles behind the McNabb
and Mallory decisions will lend insight into the current ruling in the
Miranda case.
The purpose of the federal procedural requirement of producing an
accused before a magistrate without unnecessary relay, and the resultant
exclusion of statements given during such a delay, is to avoid the evils of
incommunicado interrogation."0 Upon production before the commis-
sioner the accused is told of his right to counsel; his right to remain silent;
and is warned of the use in evidence of any given statement.
22 Supra note 5, at 460. See also, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
23 168 U.S. 532 (1897), "In criminal trials in the courts of the United States, whenever
a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue
is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment... commanding that no person
'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id. at 542.
24 18 U.S.C.A., Rule 5 (a): "An officer making an arrest ... shall take the arrested
person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner ..
25 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 27 Supra note 5, at 463.
26 Supra note 7. 28 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
29 "The Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege
that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement-the right of a person
to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will."
Id. at 8.
s0 "this procedural requirement checks resort to those reprehensible practices
known as the 'third degree' which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still find
their way into use. It aims to avoid all the implications of secret interrogation of persons
accused of crime." Supra note 25, at 344..
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The Supreme Court, by way of its ruling in McNabb and Mallory, real-
ized the necessity of warning the accused of his rights as a means to avoid
the harmful effect of secret questioning. As stated by Justice Frankfurter
in Mallory:
The arrested person may of course be "booked" by the police. But, he is not
to be taken to police headquarters in order to carry out a process of inquiry
that lends itself, even if not so designed, to eliciting damaging statements to
support the arrest and ultimately his guilt.a1
It is these principles8 2 that the Supreme Court elucidates in its ruling in the
Miranda case, being of the opinion that the very fact of in-custody inter-
rogation tends to undermine the accused's fifth amendment right.
As to the basic requirement of the silence warning, the court emphasizes
the point that the adversary system has begun once the accused is in the
hands of skilled interrogators. 38 The very fact of being within the physical
confines of a police interrogation room causes the accused to be under a
compulsion to speak:8 4
[A]n individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, sur-
rounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion
81 Supra note 7, at 454 (emphasis added).
32 "We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to
informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody question-
ing." Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra note 5, at 461.
38 A suggestion to law enforcement officers as to the proper atmosphere in which
to interrogate an accused has been stated as follows: "If at all practicable, the inter-
rogation should take place in the interogator's office or at least in a room of his own
choice. The subject should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own
home he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware of
his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions .... Moreover, his family and
other friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his office the inter-
rogator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the
law." O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1959). This text, along with
LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (1953) and CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND
CONFESSIONS (1962), by INBAU and REID, are handbooks of current investigative tech-
niques, and while not official manuals, are extensively used by law enforcement agencies,
with sales over forty-four thousand. See, Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra note 5,
at 449, n. 9.
34 The following is a paraphrase of the materials contained in the texts listed supra
note 33, and was taken from a footnote in a comment, The Right to Counsel During
Police Interrogation, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 337, 351-352, n. 75, and utilized in the Brief of
Counsel for Ernesto A. Miranda, p. 45: "Impress the accused with your certainty of
his guilt, and comment upon his psychological symptoms of guilt, such as the pulsation
of a carotid artery, nail biting, dryness of mouth etc., smoking should be discouraged
because this is a tension reliever ... the sympathetic approach-anyone else under such
circumstances would have acted the same way, suggests a less repulsive reason for the
crime, and, once he confesses, extract the real reason, condemn the victims, the accom-
plice or anyone else upon whom some degree of moral responsibility might be placed;
understanding approach-a gentle pat on the shoulder, a confession is the only decent
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*.. cannot be otherwise than under a compulsion to speak. As a practical mat-
ter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may well
be greater thanin the courts or other official investigations where there are often
impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery. 5
Aside from what the Court feels are the inherent compulsions to speak in
the atmosphere of police custody, the factor of the unawareness of the
accused as to the existence of his fifth amendment right is stressed. 6 The
warning as to silence will aid in overcoming the pressures of interroga-
tion,8 7 and enable the accused to fully comprehend his position. Warning
the accused that any statement made by him may be used as evidence
against him, is necessary to make the individual aware of the consequences
of waiving his right to remain silent. The Court expressed this point by
saying that "[i]t is only through an awareness of these consequences that
there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of
the privilege." 8
The requirement of counsel is the most controversial of the procedural
safeguards insisted upon by the Court. The dilemma between the rights of
society on one hand, and the rights of the individual on the other, created
by the presence of counsel during interrogation, has been ably stated by
Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Watts v. Indiana:39
To subject one without counsel to questioning which may be and is intended
to convict him, is a real peril to individual freedom. To bring in a lawyer means
a real peril to the solution of crime. .. . Any lawyer worth his salt will tell the
suspect in no uncertain terms to make no such statement to police under any
circumstances. 40
thing to do, I would tell my own brother to confess; forceful approach-exaggerate
the charges against the accused; sweet and sour approach (one policeman is hostile
to him while another acts as his friend); interrogation of the reluctant witness-at first
be gentle and promise him police protection, then, if he still refuses to talk, attempt
to break the bond of loyalty between him and the accused or even accuse him of the
offense and interrogate him as if he were the offender."
35 Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra note 5, at 461.
36 The problem of the unawareness of the accused was noted by Justice Black in
an earlier decision in In Re Grogans Petition, 352 U.S. 330, 345 (1957): "It is said that
a witness can protect himself against some of the many abuses possible in a secret
interrogation by asserting the privilege against self-incrimination. But this proposition
collapses under anything more than the most superficial consideration. The average
witness [suspect] has little, if any, idea when or how to raise any of his constitutional
privileges."
37 "It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator's
imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will continue
until a confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation is itself damn-
ing and will bode ill when presented to a jury." Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra
note 5, at 468.
38 Ibid. 39 338 U.S. 49 (1949). 40 Id. at 59.
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The necessity of counsel at an early stage as required by Miranda, was
previously noted by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in In Re Gro-
gans Petition.41 Justice Black stated that "the right to use counsel at the
formal trial is a very hollow thing, when for all practical purposes, the
conviction is assured by pre-trial examination. '42 Justice Douglas, also a
member of the majority in Miranda, made an earlier comment on the need
for counsel at an early critical stage, in a preface to a symposium on the
right to counsel in the Minnesota Law Review:4
[T]he need for the advice and guidance of counsel is not limited to formal
courtroom proceedings. The need for counsel exists whenever the procedural
and substantive rights of an accused may fail to be asserted fully because of
his ignorance or experience.... Police interrogation is a very relevant example
where this need arises. .... 44
The presence of counsel during interrogation also will protect against
the possibilities of "led confessions," and avoid the untrustworthiness of
the statement. It is emphasized that the right to counsel at this point does
not depend upon a formal request, and the failure to request counsel does
constitute a waiver of that right. As stated by the Court, "the accused who
does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the
person who most needs counsel. '45
The requisite of appointing counsel has raised the legitimate concern of
all interested parties as to the cost and practicality problems raised by the
advent of the station-house lawyer. 46 While realizing these difficulties, the
Court also realized the injustice involved in allowing counsel at the inter-
rogation stage for only those who can afford it:
41 Supra note 36. 42 Id. at 344. 43 45 MiNN.. L. REv. 693, 694 (1961).
44 d at 694. See also United States v. Richmond, 197 F. Supp. 125, (D. Conn. 1960),
wherein the court stated: "Statements elicited during questioning are bound to be
colored to some extent by the purpose of the questioner, who eventually leads the
witness in the absence of court control. The coloring is compounded where the
statement is not taken down stenographically, but written out as a narrative in language
supplied by the questioner. Where the state of mind of the defendant is an issue in the
case, as in determining the degree of a homicide, this wording is of vital importance."
4 Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra note 5, at 470. This same point was noted
earlier by the Supreme Court of California in a much discussed case interpreting Esco-
bedo v. State of Illinois: 'We cannot penalize a defendant who, not understanding his
constitutional rights, does not make a request and by such failure demonstrates his
unawareness. To require the request would be to favor the defendant whose sophis-
tication or status has fortuitously prompted him to make it." People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.
2d 338, 351, 398 P.2d 361-370 (1965).
46 See, e.g., Brief for the National District Attorneys Association as amicus curiae,
Miranda v. State of Arizona as appearing in May, June N.DA.A. (1966); Brief for the
State of Arizona, and DEFENDER NEWSLETTER, NATiONAL LEGAL Am AND DEFENDER As-
sOcIATION, Vol. I, No. 3 (July 2, 1964).
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The warning of. the right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms
that would convey to the indigent-the person most often subjected to interro-
gation-the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present.47
The Court is concerned with the rights of our less fortunate citizens, and it
is precisely those who will benefit by the decision in Miranda. This was
succinctly stated by counsel for Ernesto A. Miranda in their brief on his
behalf before the Supreme Court:
None of this has any application to organized crime at all. The criminal gangs
know perfectly well what tools, both physical and legal, they may use in their
battle with society. The confession and right to counsel cases which have been
before this court so constantly since Powell v. Alabama have almost never in-
volved gangtype criminals. The crimes from Powell (rape) to Miranda (rape)
have almost always been rapes and murders, involving defendants poor, poorly
educated, and very frequently, as here, of very limited mental abilities. The
rich, the well born, and the able are adequately protected . . . and the sophisti-
cates of crime do not need this protection.48
It is thus seen that it is primarily the low income and uneducated group-
ings in our society who will be given the judicial consideration due them,
by way of the requirements of the Miranda case and not the organized
criminal or recidivist.
A LEGISLATIVE SUGGESTION TO THE EFFECTUATION OF MIRANDA
Questions have arisen as to how much opportunity exists on the part of
law enforcement agencies to meet the requirements of the Miranda deci-
sion through appropriate legislation. The Court has not set out rules of law
requiring strict adherence. What the Court has done is to state the sub-
stantive needs, while allowing legislative action by state bodies and Con-
gress. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority, has put it in the
following manner:
Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straightjacket which will
handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We
encourage Congress and the states to continue in their laudable search for
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while
promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we
are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused
persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed .... 49
47 Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra note 5, at 473. The Court also states that "the
expedient of giving a warning is too simple and the rights involved too important to
engage in ex post facto inquiries into financial ability when there is any doubt at all
on that score."
48 Brief for Ernesto A. Miranda, supra note 34 at 37.
49 Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 5, at 467.
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Thus it is seen that the Court leaves room for the adoption of reasonable
alternatives so long as the accused's privilege against self-incrimination is
adequately protected. 50
At this point, it will be of value to examine one possible method of
effectuation open to law enforcement agencies; the adoption of a Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure,5 drawn by the American Law Insti-
tute. The Model Code will receive extensive analysis in the following
pages due to the fact that its provisions parallel strikingly the admissibility
requirements as set out by the Supreme Court in the Miranda decision. An
additional reason for this examination is that the Code is directed primarily
at pre-arraignment procedures in an urban setting, the area most affected
by the Miranda decision. The Code seeks to protect the same basic rights
that were the basis of the Court's concern in Miranda:
The recognition of the dignity of the individual also requires that he not be
lightly accused of wrongdoing. Official action which implies no accusation
is more easily justified than is constraint such as post arrest detention in a
police station. [Finally, when] there is an urgent public need to immobilize
a person and to require his presence for official inquiry, his dignity and au-
tonomy must not be infringed by tactics which lead him to feel that the choice
whether or not to cooperate is no longer his .... 52
As to the warnings required by the Court in Miranda, it was noted
earlier in this comment that they are operable whenever the individual is
first subjected to police interrogation or "otherwise deprived of his liberty
of actions in any significant way. ' 53 These requirements are paralleled in
Sections 3.08 (d) and 4.01 (2) of the Model Code. Section 3.08 provides
for a warning upon arrest:
Upon making any arrest, a law enforcement officer shall
(d) as promptly as is reasonable under the circumstances, and in any event
before engaging in any sustained questioning, warn such person that he
is not obliged to say anything or answer any questions, that anything
he says may be used in evidence, and that upon arrival at the police
station he will be permitted to communicate by telephone with coun-
sel, relatives or friends.54
50 Ibid.: "It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the
privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States .... Therefore we cannot
say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution
for the inherent compulsion of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted."
51 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
52 Id. at xxi.
53 Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra note 5, at 444.
54 "[T]he coercive effect of an arrest is such that it will often lead the arrested
person to believe that he must respond to police inquiry, and given the importance that
the Code attaches to uncompelled choice to cooperate, a warning which informs the
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Article Four, entitled "Disposition of Arrested Persons," adequately in-
sures that the accused is made continuously aware of his privilege of not
cooperating if he so chooses. Section 4.01, "Disposition of Arrested Per-
sons; Warnings," provides in subsection (2) that,
(T)he station officer shall immediately inform the arrested person,
(b) that he is not obliged to say anything 5 and that anything he says may
be used in evidence;
(c) that he may promptly communicate by telephone with counsel, 56 rela-
tives or friends and that if necessary, funds will be provided to enable
him to do so .... 17
The arrested person is also to be immediately given a printed form which
in plain language contains the substance of the spoken warnings. He is
asked to read and sign a statement that reads, "I have read the warning
given above and understand it."58 The officer is then required to counter-
sign the form. Section 4.09 also requires sound recordings of the adminis-
tration of the warnings.5 9 These sections adequately inform the accused of
his fifth amendment right and give the state a means of establishing at trial
the giving of the required warnings.
The most controversial portion of the Miranda decision, that which re-
quires the presence of counsel during interrogation, is covered by the
Model Code in Section 5.07 (1):
Counsel for an arrested person shall have prompt access to him, by telephone,
and in person on counsel's arrival at any place where such person is detained.
Counsel for an arrested person shall not be prevented from staying at any
such place and being allowed access to the arrested person whenever such
person requests his presence. 60
arrested person of the limits of his obligation in his new situation seems indespensible."
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 3.08, note (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
This parallels the warning to suspects as required in the English judges Rules: "You are
not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be put
in writing and given in evidence." 1964 CRIM. L. REv. (Eng.) 166-170.
55 Id. Comment to Article Four. ". .. a full and fair warning is a crucial premise to
the state's right to subject one in custody to inquiry.... An arrested person's situation
at the police station will so often imply compulsion, particularly to the ignorant and
uneducated, that an affirmative step to dispel the implication is surely called for."
56 Section 4.01, in a note following it, provides for a warning as to appointed counsel
for indigents if required in the jurisdiction, and thus will cover that requirement of
Miranda.
57 Supra note 51, at 4.01 (2).
58 Ibid.
59 Section 4.09, dealing with sound recordings, will be discussed later in this comment
when dealing with the interrogation of the accused.
6o Supra note 51, at 5.07 (1).
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By thus providing access of counsel at any time, the Code attempts to
dispel, as desired by the court in Miranda, "the compelling pressures of the
interrogation process."' 1
The framers of the Model Code, in this section, as does the Court in
Miranda, express their main concern in the direction of the accused's privi-
lege against self-incrimination:
Although we do not believe that a state has an affirmative obligation to
insure that persons in custody will not incriminate themselves, this does not
mean that the state has the right to tip the scales the other way and prevent
a person in custody from seeking aid and assistance at every step of the
investigation if he wishes to have it.02
In addition to allowing the presence of counsel, 3 the Code also requires
sound recordings of all interrogation as a means of avoiding controversy
at trial as to what transpired. Section 4.09 (3) (b) requires such record-
ings for any interrogation involving more than a few brief questions. This
recording is to indicate the duration of the session and is to be accom-
panied by a written record indicating the names of the officers conducting
the questioning.(4 Various other sections of the Code provide that no
abuse, deceptions as to rights, or unfair inducements be used during any
questioning, 5 in an attempt to bolster the accused's right to remain silent.
The final section of the Model Code to be examined is article nine,
which provides for the exclusion of statements elicited through violations
of the Code. Section 9.03 (1) provides in part that,
[I]f an officer fails to issue the warning required . . .no statement made by
such person after he should have been so warned and prior to any time that
such failure is cured, 0 [unless] it is made in the presence or upon consultation
61 Supra note 51, note to § 5.07: "This section expresses the principle that at no time
may an arrested person be held incommunicado in order to facilitate the investigation.
Not only is coercion deterred if the person is always available to advisors, but more
important, the affirmative effort to undermine a person's autonomy, which purposeful
isolation imports, cannot be justified as a means of eliciting information .... This section
thus provides that counsel shall have prompt access to the prisoner and may at his re-
quest remain and consult with him during any questioning."
02 Supra note 51, Comment to 5 5.07.
05 The Code allows questioning of the accused until the arrival of counsel, and thus
would require amending to meet the Miranda requirement of no questioning until the
arrival of counsel.
64 Supra note 51, S 4.09 (3) (b).
05 "It would be grossly inconsistent with the purpose of these protective provisions
if the Code were to fail to make it clear that officers must not undercut those warnings
of rights by deceiving an arrested person about his right to remain silent." MODEL CODE
OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, Comment to S 5.02.
60 A failure to warn will be cured if after such failure the warning was subsequently
issued and the court feels that the delay in issuing it did not substantially prejudice
the arrested person. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, S 9.03 (1).
COMMENTS
with counsel, shall be admitted into evidence against such person in a criminal
proceeding in which he is the defendant.67
Thus it is seen that this section, as does Miranda, excludes statements taken
via a violation of the accused's fifth amendment privilege. It can be per-
ceived, by the above examination of relevant extracts from the Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, that adequate measures may be
taken by law enforcement bodies, on their own, to effectuate the pro-
cedural requirements of the Miranda decision.
CONCLUSION
The recognition by the Supreme Court, as well as by the framers of the
Model Code, of the importance of apprising an accused of his basic consti-
tutional rights, indicates an awareness among those concerned with crimi-
nal justice in this nation, that large groups in our population have been
inadequately protected in a system espousing equality under the law. The
methodology utilized to protect these individuals has, however, drawn the
grave concern of the dissenting Justices.6" The fact that the Court bases its
decision on the fifth amendment, rather than on the traditional case by
case method, under the due process test, drew sharp criticism from the
dissenters. 69 Nevertheless, the very nature of our Constitution requires and
demands elasticity to meet the needs of time. As noted by Judge Frank in
his dissenting opinion in United States v. Grunewald:0
The critics of the Supreme Court, however, in their overemphasis on the
history of the fifth amendment privilege, overlook the fact that a noble
privilege often transcends its origins, that creative misunderstandings account
for some of our most cherished values and institutions; such a misunderstanding
may be the mother of invention.71
The apprising of an accused, especially a poor and uneducated one, of his
right to remain silent, and the procedural devices necessary to secure that
6 7 Supra note 51, S 9.03 (1).
68 "The real concern is not the unfortunate consequences of this new decision on the
criminal law as an abstract, disembodied series of authoritative proscriptions, but the
impact on those who rely on the public authority for protection and who without it
can only engage in violent self-help with guns, knives and the help of their neighbors
similarly inclined. There is, of course, a saving factor: the next victims are uncertain,
unnamed, and unrepresented in this case." Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra note 5, at
542 (White, J., dissenting).
69 "The proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody
interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority opinion and without a
clear waiver of counsel has no significant support in the history of the privilege or
in the language of the fifth amendment." Id. at 526.
70233 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
71 Id. at 581.
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right, are required by our Constitution, which is designed to protect the
sophisticates as well as the uninformed of our nation.72
The problem of crime is a continuing one, calling for greater and more
scientifically effective methods of detection. However, the need for a solu-
tion to the problem does not warrant a denial of basic rights to the citizen-
ry. As stated by Professor Sutherland, "[t]he war on crime is not a
sporadic crisis, here today and gone tomorrow, justifying in its brief com-
bat stage a shelving of long-standing immunities of the citizens.
' 73
The concern expressed by some that the warning to an accused of his
constitutional right to remain silent will tend to hamper effective law en-
forcement, 74 is not one that should exist in a free society. This point was
admirably noted by Justice Goldberg in the majority opinion in Escobedo
v. State of Illinois:75
We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no system of crimi-
nal justice can, or should survive if it comes to depend for its continued
effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their consti-
tutional rights. No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an
accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and
exercise these rights. If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the
effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very
wrong with that system. 76
The Supreme Court of the United States, in rendering its decision in the
Miranda case, has given affirmative voice to that principle and paved the
way for a true and just application of constitutional guarantees to the
accused.
Terrence Kiely
72 "There is necessarily a direct relation between the importance of a stage to the
police in their quest for a confession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused.
• ..Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the right of
the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination."
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1963).
73 Sutherland, Crime and Confessions, 79 HARVARD L. REv. 21, 40-41 (1965).
74 "The fear of admonishment is that it will benefit only the recidivist and the pro-
fessional." Brief for the N.D.A.A. as amicus curiae, supra, note 46.
75 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1963).
761d. at 490.
